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TRADE LAW-NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IN A
"GOOD CAUSE" DETERMINATION PROCEEDING UNDER SECTION
201(E) OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 ARE NOT REQUIRED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT ITSELF OR BY CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PRO-
CESS. (Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, E.D.N.Y. 1978).
Title II of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Trade Act) permits
domestic industries to seek relief from injurious import competi-
tion by petitioning the United States International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC).1 After investigating the industry's claims, the ITC for-
wards its report and recommendation to the President who then
decides what relief, if any, will be provided.! Section 201(e)' of the
Trade Act authorizes only one investigation into a particular sub-
ject matter area within a twelve month period. Once it has made
' Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978-2077 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2102-2487
(1976)) (hereinafter referred to as the Trade Act).
Title II of the Trade Act is set out in sections 201 through 284 and codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-2394 (1976).
The United States International Trade Commission is "an independent agency created by
the Congress, to which Congress has delegated some of its constitutional authority to
regulate foreign commerce." Minchew & Webster, Regulating Unfair Practices In Interna-
tional Trade: The Role of the United States International Trade Commission, 8 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 27, 28 (1978). The agency was originally denominated the United States Tariff
Commission, Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 795, but has since been "renamed
as the United States International Trade Commission." 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (1976).
' Sections 201 through 203 of the Trade Act set out the important relief procedures. 19
U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976).
The remedies available to the President are contained in section 203 which states in part:
(a) If the President determines to provide import relief ... he shall ...
(1) proclaim an increase in, or imposition of, any duty on the article causing or
threatening to cause serious injury to such industry;
(2) proclaim a tariff-rate quota on such article;
(3) proclaim a modification of, or imposition of, any quantitative restriction on
the import into the United States of such article;
(4) negotiate orderly marketing agreements with foreign countries limiting the
export from foreign countries and the import into the United States of such ar-
ticles; or
(5) take any combination of such actions.
19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
Section 201(e) of the Trade Act states:
Except for good cause determined by the Commission to exist, no investigation
for the purposes of this section shall be made with respect to the same subject
matter as a previous investigation under this section, unless 1 year has elapsed
since the Commission made its report to the President of the results of such
previous investigation.
19 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (1976).
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its initial investigation, the ITC may not reinvestigate that same
area for one year unless it finds that "good cause" exists.' Certain
procedures used in making this section 201(e) "good cause" deter-
mination were recently challenged in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. Plaintiffs claimed
that since the ITC had failed to give notice or to provide an oppor-
tunity to be heard at the "good cause" determination proceeding,
the resulting import relief measures ordered by the President
should be invalidated. Held: Notice and opportunity to be heard
in a "good cause" determination proceeding under section 201(e) of
the Trade Act of 1974 are not required either by the provisions of
the statute itself or by the requirements of constitutional due pro-
cess since the "good cause" determination proceeding is only a
threshold factual determination which does not affect plaintiffs'
rights or property interests. Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F.
Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).1
In September, 1975, after a petition by members of the domestic
footwear industry,' the ITC conducted an initial investigation into
the effect of non-rubber footwear imports on American industry.
On February 8, 1976, the ITC reported to the President and recom-
mended that tariff increases be ordered.' President Ford found,
'I
' The district court's decision on the merits was not arrived at directly. On June 10, 1977,
the district court had originally dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the controversy. The court cited 28 U.S.C. § 1582 as giving the United
States Customs Court exclusive jurisdiction over all civil actions filed pursuant to the
Tariff Act of 1930 as amended.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, stating:
In the present case, the trade agreements regulate exports from a foreign na-
tion. Violation of these export limits subjects the foreign exporter to heavy civil
and criminal sanctions in the country of export. There is accordingly every
likelihood that the agreements will be effectively enforced abroad, with the result
that no occasion for protest under section 514 will ever present itself, and no
Custom Court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1582 will arise. The point is not that
the dispute is not presently ripe for adjudication in the Customs Court, but rather
that the case will never ripen sufficiently to meet.the statutory requirements for
jurisdiction. When this situation occurs, jurisdiction over a customs matter
which presumptively inheres in the Customs Court reverts to the District Court
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.
Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396, 399-400 12d Cir. 1977). The court of appeals
then remanded the case back to the district court to consider the questions of standing and
ripeness.
' After being petitioned by the American Footwear Industries Association and two
domestic footwear trade unions, the ITC began this investigation into the effects of foreign
competition on September 17, 1975. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law on the Merits at 10,
Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977).
'i&
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however, that the domestic footwear industry was in a state of
economic recovery, and therefore import relief was not warranted
at that time.' Notwithstanding the President's findings, the
Senate Finance Committee passed a resolution' on September 22,
1976 calling upon the ITC to reinvestigate the effects of import
competition on the domestic footwear industry. Since it had been
less than one year since the ITC's prior report to the President on
February 8, 1976, it was necessary for the ITC to find that "good
cause" existed before it commenced a reinvestigation.
On October 5, 1976, without giving notice or providing an oppor-
tunity to be heard to the public or to interested parties, the ITC
determined that sufficient "good cause" did exist to warrant
reinvestigation of the effect of foreign imports on the domestic
footwear industry. 10 After conducting a reinvestigation," which
did include notice and public hearings, the ITC found that the
domestic industry was threatened. The ITC sent its recommenda-
tions for import relief to President Carter, who rejected the
specific recommendations of the ITC report 2 and ordered the
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Robert S. Strauss,
' On April 16, 1976, President Ford announced that since the domestic footwear industry
was showing signs of recovery, neither the tariff-rate quota system nor the tariff rate sug-
gested by the ITC would be imposed. Id
The resolution passed by the Senate Finance Committee is as follows:
Resolved by the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate, That (a)
pursuant to section 201(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission shall promptly make an investigation to determine
whether footwear is being imported into the United States in such increased
quantities as to be a substantial cause, or threat thereof, of serious injury to the
domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the im-
ported footwear. For purposes of this resolution, the term "footwear" means ar-
ticles classified under items 700.05 through 700.85, inclusive (except items 700.51,
700.52, 700.53 and 700.60), of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (19 U.S.C.
§ 1202).
(b) It is the sense of the Committee that changing circumstances, including in-
creasing imports and rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in the domestic
footwear industry, constitute good cause, within the meaning of section 201(e) of
such Act, to commence an investigation.
10 In the Federal Register of October 12, 1976, the public was informed that a Senate
Finance Committee resolution had been received by the ITC, which, in acting on the resolu-
tion, had determined on October 5, 1976 that good cause did exist for a reinvestigation into
the footwear industry. The announcement then gave the date of the public hearing to be
held in connection with the reinvestigation. 41 FED. REG. 44,756 (1976).
" The ITC conducted the reinvestigation and held hearings on the matter from
December 7 through December 9, 1976. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law on the Merits at 12.
12 The ITC report to the President found that injury to the domestic industry "existed
and recommended the imposition of a tariff-rate quota system imposing increased duties on
amounts imported above quota levels." Id
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to negotiate and enter into Orderly Marketing Agreements
(OMAs) with the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea.13
These OMAs, which deal with the number of pairs of non-rubber
athletic footwear that Taiwan and South Korea will export to the
United States, were proclaimed by the President on June 22,
1977.4
In June, 1977, plaintiffs, Sneaker Circus, Inc., Blazer Sports In-
ternational, Inc., and Bob Wolf Associates, Inc.,"5 brought an ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, seeking to enjoin the signing the OMAs, claiming, in-
ter alia,6 that the OMAs were invalid since the ITC had failed to
provide notice and an opportunity to be heard at the "good cause"
determination proceeding under section 201(e) of the Trade Act.
The Trade Act of 1974 is the latest in a series of acts17 which
have attempted to promote the economic growth of the United
States by reducing barriers to foreign trade. During the late nine-
"8 Agreement on Import of Non-Rubber Footwear, United States-Republic of China, June
14, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8884; Agreement on Import of Non-Rubber Footwear, United States-
Republic of Korea, June 21, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8885.
Both of these orderly marketing agreements are authorized by section 203 of the Trade
Act, set out in note 2 supra. The OMAs deal with voluntary restraints on exports to the
United States of certain non-rubber footwear products (leather, plastic, etc.), and will re-
main in effect from June 28, 1977 through June 30, 1981.
" Pres. Proc. No. 4510 [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4574, 42 FED. REG. 32,436
(1977). In this proclamation, President Carter notes that although the ITC recommended
tariff-rate quotas on imports, he has decided that orderly marketing agreements should be
implemented as the appropriate remedy.
I' Plaintiffs are, respectively, a retailer, a wholesaler and an importer of the type of non-
rubber footwear regulated by the OMAs. Plaintiffs claim that as a result of the OMAs they
are unable to purchase adequate supplies of the foreign footwear products.
" Besides challenging the procedures used by the ITC in making the "good cause" deter-
mination, plaintiffs also challenged the actual finding of "good cause," claiming that the ITC
did not have sufficient evidence to make the determination. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law
on the Merits at 44.
Plaintiffs also claimed that President Carter failed to comply with sections 202 and 203 of
the Trade Act which require the President to give notice of his determination of the
remedy to be implemented within certain specific time periods. Id. at 79.
Finally, plaintiffs claimed that the OMAs violated the Treaties of Commerce which the
United States had entered into with the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, 8
U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3974; 63 Stat. 1300, T.I.A.S. No. 1871; the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade (GATT), done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 43 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 56-61
U.N.T.S. (January 1, 1948); and section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Id at
85-108.
The district court found no merit in any of plaintiffs' claims.
" The Trade Act of 1974 is the thirteenth extension of the Trade Agreements Act of
1934. See generally Metzger, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 51 GEO. L.J. 425, 426
(1963Y Note, 8 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 63 (1975).
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teenth century the United States followed a policy of economic
isolation while seeking to develop its own industries without
political or economic interference from abroad.18 The early twen-
tieth century, however, found a strong and expanding domestic
economy. With this increased domestic productivity came the
need for new markets, and a trend toward participation in the
world market emerged.19 The end of economic isolation was finally
signaled by the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 19340
which sought to promote reciprocal tariff reductions and authorized
the President to negotiate trade agreements with foreign na-
tions.2' The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 has been extended and
amended by subsequent acts.'
The most recent legislation, the Trade Act of 1974, was in-
troduced in the Congress in 1973.23 While the bill was being con-
sidered by the Senate' the domestic economy was shaken by the
combined effects of inflation and the OPEC oil embargo. 5 As a
result, the Act finally passed by Congress is a complex piece of
legislation which clearly reflects a concern for the American
economy. Thus, while the Act continues the policy of previous
legislation in promoting reductions of international trade barriers,
it also contains strengthened measures designed to protect
domestic industry from the harmful effects of foreign compe-
tition.' Title II of the Trade Act is specifically concerned with
" Metzger, supra note 17, at 426. See also S. RATNER, THE TARIFF IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1972).
", Metzger, supra note 17, at 427.
48 Stat. 943 (1934).
2 Metzger, supra note 17. at 428.
n Id
U H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives as H.R. 6767 by Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills,
among others. See Campbell, The Foreign Trade Aspects of the Trade Act of 1974, 33
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 325, 332 (1976).
2 In its report of November 26, 1974, the Senate Finance Committee notes that "the
Trade Reform Act of 1974 . . . coincides with a serious crisis in the domestic and world
economies." S. REP. NO. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7186, 7187.
U Campbell, supra note 23, at 332.
" The Trade Act's statement of purpose reads in part:
The purposes of this chapter are, through trade agreements affording mutual
benefits-
(1) to foster the economic growth of and full employment in the United States
and to strengthen economic relations between the United States and foreign
countries through open and nondiscriminatory world trade: ....
(4) to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor
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these domestic relief provisions.'
Title II provides two distinctive forms of relief to domestic in-
dustry: adjustment assistance and import relief. Adjustment
assistance offers aid to particular firms, communities, and groups
of workers who have suffered from the adverse effects of foreign
competition.28 Import relief, on the other hand, provides relief to
the industry as a whole." While the relief offered by adjustment
assistance is primarily financial,' import relief remedies are
directed toward limiting the quantities of competing foreign goods
or imposing tariffs to minimize the price benefits of the foreign
products. 1
The import relief provisions set out in section 201 of the Trade
Act define three main procedural steps. First, there is a petition
to the ITC requesting relief. According to section 201(a)(1), the
petition may be filed by "an entity, including a trade association,
firm, certified or recognized union, or group of workers, which is
representative of an industry. 32 However, section 201(b)(1) makes
it clear that an investigation may also be requested by the Presi-
dent or his Special Trade Representative, the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House, the Committee on Finance of the Senate,
or by the ITC itself.'
against unfair or injurious import competiton ....
19 U.S.C. § 2102 (1976).
Perhaps the most significant change brought about by the trade Act of 1974 in regard to
protection of domestic industry is the deletion of the requirement that the injury be direct-
ly related to a trade concession resulting from an agreement with a foreign nation. The
Senate Finance Committee Report of November 26, 1974 points out that "under present
law [referring to the trade Expansion Act of 1962], increased imports must be in major part
the result of trade agreement concessions before import relief measures are undertaken;
under the Committee's bill [referring to the Trade Act of 19741, no link to concessions would
be required." S. REP. NO. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7186, 7205.
1 Title II of the Trade Act is contained in sections 201 through 284 which are codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2394 (1976).
' The Adjustment Assistance provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 are codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2271-2394 (1976).
Some of the remedies provided under Adjustment Assistance are loan guarantee pro-
grams, employment allowances, relocation services and training assistance.
" Section 201(b)(1) speaks in terms of "... . a substantial cause of serious injury, or the
threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive
with the imported article." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1976) [emphasis added).
See note 28 supra.
, See note 2 supra.
82 19 U.S.C. § 225i(a)(1) (1976).
- 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1976).
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The second step involves the initial investigation by the ITC.
According to section 201(b)(1), the purpose of the investigation is
"to determine whether an article is being imported ... in such in-
creased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury ... "
to the American industry which produces the same type article or
product.' Whenever an investigation is held pursuant to section
201(b)(1), the section 201(c) requirements' for notice and public
hearings are activated. Once an initial investigation has been
made, section 201(e) prohibits another investigation into that same
subject matter for one year unless the ITC finds that "good
cause" exists to warrant reinvestigation."
The third step involves the ITC report of findings. Section
201(d)(1) requires that the ITC report to the President and include
its recommendations as to the most appropriate remedies to be
provided the domestic industry." It is then left for the President
to determine what relief, if any, will be ordered." Under the im-
port relief provisions, the President may impose a duty on the
foreign goods, proclaim a tariff-rate quota, impose any quan-
titative restriction, or negotiate an orderly marketing agreement
with the nation which is producing the competing goods.39
, Id Section 201(b)(4) defines "substantial cause" as follows:
For purposes of this section, the term "substantial cause" means a cause which
is important and not less than any other cause.
19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1976).
Section 201(c) of the Trade Act provides:
In the course of any proceeding under subsection (b) of this section, the Commis-
sion shall, after reasonable notice, hold public hearings and shall afford interested
parties an opportunity to be present, to present evidence, and to be heard at such
hearings.
19 U.S.C. § 2251(c) (1976).
See note 3 supra.
7 Section 201(d)(1) of Trade Act states:
The Commission shall report to the President its findings under subsection (b)
of this section, and the basis therefor and shall include in each report any dissent-
ing or separate views. If the Commission finds with respect to any article, as a
result of its investigation, the serious injury or threat thereof described in
subsection (b) of this section, it shall-
(A) find the amount of the increase in, or imposition of, any duty or import
restriction on such article which is necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, or
(B) if it determines that adjustment assistance under parts 2, 3, and 4 of this
subchapter can effectively remedy such injury, recommend the provision of such
assistance, and shall include such findings or recommendation in its report to the
President. The Commission shall furnish to the President a transcript of the hear-
ings and any briefs which were submitted in connection with each investigation.
19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1976).
" See note 2 supra.
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In Sneaker Circus, plaintiffs challenged, inter alia, the ITC
determination of "good cause" under section 201(e) of the Trade
Act."0 Plaintiffs claimed that the failure of the ITC to provide
notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with the
"
4good cause" determination proceeding violated not only the
statutory language of the Trade Act itself,' but also the constitu-
tional guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.'2
The opinion of the district court concluded that neither the
specific language of the Trade Act nor the fifth amendment Due
Process Clause require that notice or a hearing be provided in a
section 201(e) "good cause" determination proceeding. 3 According
to the court, the literal provisions of the Trade Act clearly in-
dicate that "Congress specifically limited the notice and hearing
requirements to proceedings brought under subsection (b)."" Fur-
thermore, this congressional design was found to be in accordance
with due process requirements. Since a decision under subsection
(b) goes to the "merits of the question of whether import relief
should be provided,"' 5 such a decision will necessarily affect "the
rights and property interests of the interested parties,""' and pro-
cedural due process must be afforded. 7 Congress apparently
recognized this constitutional implication of a section 201(b) deci-
sion, and therefore specifically required that notice and a hearing
be provided. The court found, however, that a section 201(e) pro-
ceeding did not affect the rights or property interests of the par-
ties, 8 since "the only effect of the good cause determination is to
allow a reinvestigation"'9 into the same subject matter as a previ-
40 See note 16 supra.
" Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law on the Merits at 51.
SId. at 49.
[Tihe due process clauses ... have a procedural aspect in that they guarantee
that each person shall be accorded a certain 'process' if they are deprived of life,
liberty or property. Where the power of the government is to be used against an
individual there is a right to a fair procedure to determine the basis for, and
legality of, such action.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 477 (1978). See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed2d 556 (1972).
457 F. Supp. at 786.
" Id. at 785.
45 Id.
0 Id.
" See note 42 supra.
,' 457 F. Supp. at 785.
9 Id.
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ous investigation conducted less than one year before. If "good
cause" is found to warrant a reinvestigation, then notice and an
opportunity to be heard will be afforded in connection with the
reinvestigation since such a proceeding would lead to a decision
on the merits. In holding that notice and a hearing are not re-
quired in a section 201(b) proceeding, the district court found
plaintiffs' interpretation of the provisions of the Trade Act to be
"troubled at best"' and without merit.
Plaintiffs commenced their statutory argument by noting that a
Senate Finance Committee request for an initial investigation was
only authorized by section 201(b)(1).51 Plaintiffs then directed the
court's attention to section 201(c) which specifically mandates
notice and an opportunity to be heard "in the course of any pro-
ceeding under subsection (b). ."I' Since it was the Senate Finance
Committee which requested the reinvestigation, and since a re-
quest by the Senate Finance Committee is only authorized by sec-
tion 201(b)(1), then the notice and hearing requirements of section
201(c) should apply to any proceeding initiated by a Senate
Finance Committee request. Thus the mere fact that the request
is made by the Senate Finance Committee activates the notice and
hearing requirements of section 201(c).
Plaintiffs' analysis of the statute fails on two counts. First, it
does not recognize the difference between an initial investigation
under section 201(b)(1) and a reinvestigation pursuant to section
201(e). The language of section 201(b)(1) is mandatory and leaves
nothing to the discretion of the ITC. It states that "upon ... re-
quest ... the Commission shall promptly make an investigation..."3
Upon receiving a request, the ITC may not refuse to investigate.
The notice and hearing provisions of section 201(c) are then re-
quired to be implemented in each of these initial investigations
made by the ITC.
The language of section 201(e), however, is discretionary. It
states that there is to be no reinvestigation within one year of an
initial investigation "except for good cause determined by the
Commission to exist . . ."" The language of section 201(e) clearly
leaves it to the discretion of the ITC to determine if "good cause"
50Id
'" See note 33 supra.
"See note 35 supra.
" See note 33 supra.
,See note 3 supra.
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does exist to justify a reinvestigation; the reinvestigation,
however, is not mandatory.
Regardless of who makes the request for a reinvestigation,
then, the ITC is not authorized to commence a reinvestigation
unless it finds that "good cause" exists to do so." If "good cause"
is found, then there is no dispute that the reinvestigation is to be
treated as an initial investigation as far as procedures are con-
cerned. There would be notice and opportunity to be heard pro-
vided for reinvestigations as well as initial investigations. But
plaintiffs' argument would result in notice and hearing being pro-
vided at two different points in the same proceeding: once at the
point where it is determined that a reinvestigation should be made,
and then again at the reinvestigation itself.
The very structure of the language of section 201 precludes
such a procedure. When the ITC receives a request for an initial
investigation it is not required to provide notice and a hearing on
the question of whether it should commence an investigation; sec-
tion 201(b)(1) commands the ITC to investigate .5 Likewise, the
Trade Act should not be read as requiring notice and a hearing in
connection with a preliminary proceeding, the sole purpose of
which is to determine if there exists sufficient "good cause" to
reinvestigate. Furthermore, since there will be notice and a hear-
ing in regard to both an initial investigation and a reinvestigation,
there is no total deprivation of an opportunity for interested par-
ties to be heard.
Plaintiff's argument contains a second flaw. In claiming that the
section 201(c) notice and hearing requirements 57 were activated
because the request for a reinvestigation was from the Senate
Finance Committee, plaintiffs presuppose that the Committee
would be powerless to request such a reinvestigation without the
specific authorization contained in section 201(b). However, there
is nothing in the statute which leads to such a conclusion. Section
201(e) authorizes a reinvestigation upon "good cause determined
by the Commission to exist."" There is no limitation as to who
may request a reinvestigation, nor is there any reason to believe
that the ITC could not commence a reinvestigation in the absence
I One member of the ITC, Commissioner Ablondi, stated that a Senate Finance Commit-
tee resolution in itself would be sufficient to constitute "good cause" to justify a
reinvestigation under section 201(e). See 457 F. Supp. 771, 784 n.12 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
See note 33 supra.
', See note 35 supra.
See note 3 supra.
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of a request from anyone. It would be sufficient that the ITC acted
on its own so long as there was a finding of "good cause" by the
ITC. The district court, then, was correct in holding that the
statutory language of the Trade Act does not require that notice
or an opportunity to be heard be provided in a "good cause" deter-
mination proceeding under section 201(e) of the Trade Act.59
Plaintiffs also claimed that, even if not mandated by the specific
language of the Trade Act, notice and an opportunity to be heard
were nevertheless required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." Plaintiffs cited Hanly v. Kleindienst"' as authority
for the proposition "that notice and hearing are necessary before
a preliminary or threshold determination of significance is made. 2
In Hanly, the court was dealing with an agency determination
under the National Environmental Protection Act. 3 If the agency
found that a proposed construction project would have a signifi-
cant impact on the environment, then an environmental impact
statement would be required. The procedure employed in the
drafting of such a statement included a public hearing. However,
if the agency found that the impact of the project was insignifi-
cant, then no environmental impact statement with its concomi-
tant public hearing would be required. In a very real sense, then,
the finding of a need for an environmental impact statement
would determine whether an opportunity to be heard would be
provided before property interests were affected by the construc-
tion project. The Hanly court recognized this and held that the
agency determination should be accompanied by an opportunity
for interested parties to be heard."
The "good cause" determination proceeding in Sneaker Circus,
however, cannot be construed as being determinative on the ques-
tion of a hearing, since it was only a threshold factual determina-
" 457 F. Supp. 771, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
, See note 42 supra.
471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
Plaintiffs appear to rely on the following language of the Hanly court:
• ..before a preliminary or threshold determination of significance is made the
responsible agency must give notice to the public of the proposed major federal
action and an opportunity to submit relevant facts which might bear upon the
agency's threshold decision. We do not suggest that a full-fledged formal hearing
must be provided before each such determination is made although it should be
apparent that in many cases such a hearing would be advisable ....
471 F.2d 823, 836 (2d Cir. 1972).
" Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law on the Merits at 49.
" National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
" See Note 51 supra.
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tion which, if answered in the affirmative, would result in a
reinvestigation including notice and an opportunity to be heard.' 5
On the other hand, if "good cause" is found lacking, then there is
no reinvestigation, and thus no property rights or legal interests
placed in jeopardy.
The critical factor to be considered in agency determinations is
the effect the agency's findings will have on legal rights or proper-
ty interests. The procedural requirements of due process are ac-
tivated when legal rights or interests are put in jeopardy."6 "Thus,
when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding deter-
minations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is
imperative that those agencies use the procedures 7 which have
traditionally been associated with the judicial process. '66 In
Sneaker Circus, the court found that no legal interests were placed
in jeopardy at the "good cause" determination proceeding, and "it
is thus not a violation of the Due Process Clause not to require
notice and a hearing on the threshold question of good cause." 9
The District Court recognized that:
A proceeding under § 201(b) goes to the merits of the question of whether im-
port relief should be provided to assist a domestic industry because it is being
seriously injured by imports. A decision under § 201(b) will affect the rights and
property interests of the interested parties and they are therefore provided with
notice and an opportunity to be heard so as not to run afoul of the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. The situation is quite different with respect to a good
cause determination under § 201(e), since no rights or property interests of the
parties are affected by that determination. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,
440-44, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed2d 1307 (1960). Should the ITC determine that good
cause does exist, then the public is provided with notice and interested partes are
given the opportunity to be heard before the Commission makes its determina-
tion on the merits. The only effect of the good cause determination is to allow a
reinvestigation within one year rather than after the expiration of one year from
the previous report to the President on the same subject matter.
457 F. Supp. 771, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
See Note 40 supra.
v The District Court points out that when hearings were held in connection with the
reinvestigation in Sneaker Circus, plaintiffs "apparently" did not participate in them. 457 F.
Supp. 771, 786 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
" Former Chief Justice Warren discussed Due Process as follows:
"Due Process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and
its content varies according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental
agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the
legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures
which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the other
hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for exam-
ple, when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not
necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.
Hannah v. Larch, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1514 (1960).
" 457 F. Supp. 771, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L.
The district court was sound in its analysis of both the provi-
sions of the Trade Act and the due process procedural re-
quirements. A careful reading of the Trade Act finds no require-
ment for either notice or a hearing in connection with the "good
cause" determination proceeding under section 201(e). Moreover,
since the "good cause" proceeding does not threaten any party's
legal rights, the due process procedural requirements are not ap-
plicable. It does seem, however, that the ITC would be wise to in-
itiate a policy providing notice and an opportunity to be heard in
these proceedings. Such a policy might serve to prevent future
allegations of deference to political pressure such as those made in
Sneaker Circus."
When the Senate Finance Committee voted on the resolution
requesting the ITC to reinvestigate, only four Senators were pre-
sent." This can hardly be cited as evidence of a clear consensus
that there should be a reinvestigation. Furthermore, although the
Committee resolution was not received until September 28, 1976,
the ITC was able to reach a determination. that "good cause" ex-
isted just five working days later. 2 This casts some doubt on the
degree of independent research and analysis involved in the ITC
proceeding. Finally, no transcript of the "good cause" determina-
tion proceeding was made by the ITC."
The facts of the ITC "good cause" proceeding in Sneaker Circus
might be interpreted to indicate that the ITC "permitted itself to
be dictated to by outside influences allowing its judgment to be
supplanted by that of third parties; . . ."" Clearly such an in-
ference tends to cloud the image of the ITC. It would seem to be
in the best interests of everyone concerned to give any and all in-
terested parties an opportunity to present evidence and to be
heard even at a threshold factual determination proceeding under
section 201(e). If such a policy were followed, the ITC could avoid
factual situations which potentially impair its reputation as an im-
partial agency. 5
Alan Stephen Peevy
"' Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum at 1.
71 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law on the Merits at 17.
72Id.
" Id. at 18.
74 Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum at 1.
,' In at least one subsequent proceeding under section 201(e) the ITC has provided notice
and an opportunity to be heard. See Bolts, Nuts and Large Screws of Iron or Steel, 43 Fed.
Reg. 28057.
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